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Abstract 
The vogue position among many philosophers and physicists is that the perceptual 
appearance of tensed properties, e.g. was past, is present and will be future, involves a 
perceptual illusion at a certain level of complexity within our physical system. This 
position leads to the problem of tense, where the truth of judgments based upon 
tensed properties is called into question. After appraising several received solutions to 
the problem of tense, I argue that each is guilty of implicitly assuming a certain 
estimation of what counts as a truth-maker for tensed judgments. This estimation is 
reliant upon an entailment relation holding between linguistic representations and 
states of affairs in the world. Following John Heil, I reject the amicability of such an 
entailment relation holding in the act of truthmaking. Finally, building upon Heil’s 
own work in the study of truthmaking, I argue that tensed properties and the 
judgments that follow from their perception could be made true by the physical 
processes that bring about the appearance of these properties. In the competition of 
this task, I provide a new solution to the problem of tense.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   3	  
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TENSE 
You’re crossing the street. Unbeknownst to you, a bus turns the corner onto 
the same street. Maybe you can’t hear it. Maybe you have your headphones in. 
Maybe the driver is daydreaming. Maybe she doesn’t see you. You turn your head. 
You see the bus bearing down upon you. You make a quick calculation concerning its 
path and velocity. You lunge forward toward the sidewalk. The bus careens past. 
Your hands shake a little, but you’re ok. You continue on towards your final 
destination. 
Before you decided to lunge toward the sidewalk, you had a series of 
perceptions regarding where the bus was, where the bus is and where the bus will be. 
We call these perceptions ‘tensed perceptions.’ The italicized verbs are what we call 
‘tensed verbs.’ These tensed verbs correspond to ‘tensed properties’— was ‘past’, is 
‘present’ and will be ‘future’. The only sort of objects to which tensed properties—
past, present and future—belong are ‘enduring objects.’ Enduring objects are objects 
that move through time as wholly existent entities. To be alive now, you made a 
series of judgments based on the assumption that the bus endured as a single object 
through time. We call these judgments ‘tensed judgments.’  
The majority of philosophers and physicists tell us that tense, and tensed 
properties, don’t exist at the fundamental level of reality. Time, they posit, does not 
move around us as we exist in it as substantive wholes. Instead, at any time in which 
we exist, there is only a part of us in existence. Who we are, on this account, is the 
mereological sum of all of these temporal parts when taken together. This fact has led 
many philosophers to bend over backwards attempting to explain how we make true 
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judgments based upon perceptions of properties that do not exist. For all we know, 
tense is an illusion. Furthermore, if you had misjudged where the bus was, is and will 
be— if your perception had been skewed— would that have been an illusion as well? 
If both circumstances depict illusory perceptions yielding false judgments, then why 
in one circumstance are you still alive and not in the other?   
What I have roughly conveyed to you above is the problem of tense. True 
judgments regarding tense seem to be important for your continued survival. 
However, conventional wisdom tells us that for a judgment to be true, the perception 
upon which the judgment is based must be veridical, i.e. it must represent the true 
nature of the world. But if tense has no part in the true nature of the world, what 
makes some tensed judgments more accurate than others? 
My position is simple: true judgments concerning tense need not necessitate 
that tensed perceptions are veridical— or at least not in the way veridicality is 
conventionally understood. Put another way, true predications concerning tense need 
not necessitate the existence of tensed properties— nor enduring entities.  
While my position is simple, it is far from uncontroversial. It is a cost taken 
upon an ontology in order to be able to dissolve the problem of tense. But it is not the 
only option open; there are many. To grasp my position fully follow me as I explore 
the many hidden costs of tensed judgments. 
 
OUTLINE 
I argue that judgments concerning tensed perceptions are made true by the 
arrangement of qualitative and powerful ways that substances are. This position is 
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consistent with our fundamental physics and the truth of the B-theory of time. It 
provides an explanation for the distinction between veridical and falsidical 
perceptions of time, which allows for an account of true and false judgments of tense. 
All of this is achieved by replacing a certain estimation of truthmaking that requires 
truth-makers to be inseparably connected to the ontological status of subjects and 
properties. In its place, my account follows John Heil (2003) in positing that the truth-
makers for a named appearance should be considered those elements of our world 
that actually bring that appearance about. These elements need not be ontologically 
rich isomorphic properties corresponding to portions of our language, but may be the 
interaction of qualitatively powerful simple substances at a certain level of physical 
complexity.  
I begin by presenting and reviewing the received solutions to the problem of 
tense (Section I). These solutions include: tense nihilism, presentism, weak tense 
emergence and strong tense emergence. Tense nihilism, I argue, fails to solve the 
problem of tense but seems to remain consistent with the truth of the B-series of time 
and our best physical account of the world. Presentism solves the problem of tense by 
rejecting the truth of the B-series of time that is supported by our best physics. Weak 
tense emergence seems to solve the problem of tense, but runs afoul of the problem of 
temporary intrinsics. Strong tense emergence solves the problem of tense while 
presupposing the truth of the B-theory of time, but rejects that all properties result 
from a solely physical processes (property-physicalism). 
I then argue that each of these accounts relies upon the assumption that each 
true predicate entails some ontologically robust property out in the world (Section II). 
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I further argue that this assumption leads to the scaffolding of one’s ontology into 
downwardly dependent levels of being. This maneuver leads to additional questions 
concerning over-determination and what downwardly dependent supervenience 
relations actually amount to. Following Heil (2003), I advance the position that this 
whole enterprise of truthmaking depends upon an unexplained relation of entailment 
between articles of representation and states of affairs in the world. 
I continue in following Heil (2012) by rejecting this assumption and turning to 
the actual processes that bring the appearance, that is denoted in our language, about 
(Section III). This account of what counts as a truth-maker allows for a simplified 
ontology, which only posits qualitatively powerful modes of substances. I argue that, 
on the basis of propertied substances alone, I can account for truths concerning 
complex objects and relations— both spatial and causal.  
This new outlook on truth-makers allows for the reevaluation of what makes 
tensed judgments true (Section IV). I argue that tensed judgments are made true by 
tenseless features of our world. To accomplish this, I employ a mechanism provided 
by the Scalar Expectancy Theory of time perception that has been implemented by 
some weak tense emergentist accounts (Brogaard and Gatzia 2014) to give a plausible 
story for how interrelated propertied substances collectively provide the condition for 
the possibility of the appearance that we linguistically refer to in our tensed 
predications. I conclude by explaining the theoretical costs and advantages of my 
account in comparison to tense nihilism, presentism, weak tense emergence and 
strong tense emergence. 
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SECTION I: RECEIVED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF TENSE 
Following J.E.M. McTaggart (1908), we have predominantly thought of time 
as existing in one of two ways: as an A-series, where time is a dynamic and 
directional flow of instants, or a B-series, where time is a static series of eternal 
temporal points. Along with each theory comes a certain set of temporal properties. 
The A-series ascribes tensed properties—‘being future’, ‘being present’ and ‘being 
past’. The B-series ascribes tenseless properties—‘being earlier than x’, ‘being 
concurrent with x’ and ‘being later than x’. 
B-series properties are understood to have several advantages over A-series 
properties. First, while both A-series and B-series properties appear it be consistent 
with our best physics, it is generally understood that the physical theory of space-time 
only directly empirically supports the existence of B-series properties (Monton 2010). 
While this, obviously, does not exclude the possibility of tensed properties, the 
existence of such properties would have to be properly motivated independently of 
our best physics. Second, A-series properties require enduring objects as property 
bearers. Enduring objects are, on some accounts, necessarily ruled out if the B-series 
of time is true at the fundamental level of reality (Lewis 1986). 
These considerations, and others, have led many theorists to dismiss 
perceptions of tensed properties as being non-veridical, or illusory, features of 
reality.1 I call this position tense nihilism. The tense nihilists argument seems to run 
as follows:2 physics is not committed to the existence of the tensed properties of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 See e.g. Oaklander 1993, Dyke 2002, Skow 2011, Prosser 2012, Ingthorsson 2013 and 
Yehezkel 2013. 2 I am indebted to Brogaard and Gatzia (2014) for this synthesis of tense nihilist views. 
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ordinary experience. Any property of ordinary experience that is not one to which 
physics is committed is an illusory property. Therefore, tensed properties are illusory 
properties.  
If tense nihilism is true, this leads to the further conclusion that all judgments 
predicated on the perception of tensed properties lack adequate ontological 
grounding. Truths about tensed judgments would not exist because the presumed 
truth-makers for tensed judgments, i.e. tensed properties, do not exist. This account 
fails to explain the apparent accuracy of some tensed judgments as opposed to others. 
By the tense nihilist’s lights, all judgments concerning tense are equally false 
regardless of their outcomes. Thus, the tense nihilist rejects that the problem of tense 
is a problem worth solving.  
A divergent path would be to appeal to the thesis of presentism. On a 
presentist picture of time, only one time, the ‘now’, exists (Markosian 2004). This is 
in opposition to the presumption of eternalism, i.e. the position that all times exist 
equally, that is normally ascribed to the B-theorist’s picture of time. On a presentist 
picture, all tensed judgments are made true by reduction to the now. Tensed 
predicates of the form ‘the bus was crossing Euclid’ are hashed out in terms of the 
present, e.g. ‘presently the bus had crossed Euclid.’ That is, the truth-makers for 
tensed judgments are tensed properties held currently by some enduring entity.    
If presentism is true, tensed judgments are spared at the cost of the truth of the 
B-theory of time. The B-theory of time, which we believe is empirically supported by 
our best physics, is normally considered to espouse eternalism, i.e. the belief that all 
times are equally existent and equally real. These two theses—eternalism and 
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presentism— logically exclude one another. Thus, an appeal to presentism is the 
rejection of eternalism, which is presumably supported by our best physical account 
of time. To jettison our best physical account of time on the basis of one 
philosophical problem seems to be tantamount to throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater. That being said, it is possible that a nuanced version of presentism might 
allow for the presentists and the B-theorists to live in peace (Brogaard 2000).  
Tense emergentist views reject the tense nihilist’s assumption that if a 
property is not one to which our best physics is committed then it is illusory 
(Brogaard and Gatzia 2014). They also accept the truth of the B-theory of time at the 
fundamental level of reality. For a tense emergentist, the truth-makers for tensed 
judgments are ontologically salient tensed properties that emerge at a certain level of 
physical complexity as novel elements within the system. 
Tense emergentists views come in two varieties. Weak tense emergence 
follows from the thesis of weak emergence, which asserts that truths about emergent 
properties may be, at least theoretically, reduced to, deduced from, or explained in 
terms of, truths that hold at the fundamental level of reality (Chalmers 2006). Solidity 
is often touted as the poster child for weak emergence. The truth-maker for the 
predicate ‘is solid’ is the property of solidity itself. However, we may explain the 
existence of solidity by appealing to facts about the distribution of particles, 
electromagnetic fields and charges at certain locations in space-time and the laws that 
govern the relations between them. Weak emergence has long been considered as 
being consistent with property-physicalism, the view that all properties are 
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completely explainable without positing non-physical entities within our ontology 
(ibid.).  
Strong tense emergence follows from the thesis of strong emergence, which 
posits that not all truths about emergent properties may be reduced to, deduced from, 
or explained in terms of, truths that hold at the fundamental level of reality (ibid.). 
There has been some debate in the philosophy of mind over whether properties of 
consciousness are not strongly emergent properties (ibid.). On such an account, the 
predicate ‘is red’ would have truth-makers that were, at base, sui generis properties, 
i.e. non-physical. As opposed to weak emergence, strong emergence entails the falsity 
of property-physicalism.  
Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia have recently entertained the thesis of 
weak tense emergence in their article, “Time and Time Perception” (2014). They 
argue that if a reasonable account of the weak emergence of tensed properties may be 
given, then the philosophers who accept other weakly emergent properties, like that 
of solidity, would have no recourse but to accept tense as well.  
Brogaard and Gatzia posit the possibility that dynamic tensed properties are 
the result of tenseless B-theoretical properties being in some way ‘response-
dependent’. This means that tenseless B-theoretical properties have the disposition to 
cause the experience of tensed properties in ordinary perceivers likes us. A possible 
account of how this exchange could happen is found in the Scalar-Expectancy Theory 
of Perception, or SET for short. 
 On modern SET accounts, the existence of a clock-like mechanism internal to 
the brain generates “subjective temporal values that are typically correctly related to 
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real time” (ibid. p. 4). This mechanism is composed of several modules: a pacemaker, 
a switch, and an accumulator, as well as working and reference memory banks with a 
comparator. The linear perception of time is accounted for by a pacemaker, which 
produces consistent pulses and an accumulator that stores these pulses in the working 
and reference memory. When an event is being timed the switch allows the 
accumulator to collect the pulses emitted by the pacemaker. At the end of the timed 
event, the resulting number of pulses is compared with another reference time. This 
process produces perceptions of different time intervals in the working memory. 
These perceptions are important in many temporal tasks, such as comparing 
differential intervals for similarity. These comparative readings are then stored in the 
reference memory. The longer the durations of perceptions range, the more pulses 
will accumulate.  
 The SET brain clock mechanism is taken to establish one possible explanation 
for why some tensed perceptions come out as veridical while others may be 
considered falsidical. The experience of successive readings accounts for the way in 
which we experience events as being successive. However, a variety of other factors 
may affect one or more of the functioning modules of this mechanism. This would 
result in a malfunction within the mechanism, which would produce false readings. 
Falsidical perceptions of tense are then understood to be result of false readings 
within the perceptual SET mechanism. 
 The SET account provides Brogaard and Gatzia with a possible means for 
explaining tensed perception that is both consistent with property-physicalism and our 
best physical account of time. However, they admit that there is a larger theoretical 
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concern looming. If tensed properties are posited then they must, by necessity, belong 
to enduring entities, a possibility undermined by the problem of temporary intrinsics, 
given the truth of the B-theory of time.  
 There seems to be two possible ways that a material body may be understood 
to persist through time (Lewis 1986). The material body may either ‘endure’, if it is 
wholly present at each and every time that it is said to exist, or ‘perdure’, if it 
possesses different temporal parts that each exist at different locations in time. This 
distinction comes into play when we think about the intrinsic properties that an entity 
only holds temporarily. Sometimes I am sitting down in a bent position while at other 
times I am standing up in a straight position. I cannot possess both properties— being 
straight and being bent— intrinsically because they are mutually exclusive, thus 
contradictory if held together.  
 If a B-theory of time is true, and temporal locations are both distinct and 
eternal, the thesis of perdurantism blocks the contradiction because only one temporal 
part of me possesses any given intrinsic property at any given temporal location. This 
fact entails that the truth of perdurantism follows from the truth of the B-series. That 
is, if the B-series account of time is true, then perdurantism had better be true on pain 
of contradiction. On the view that I endure, however, where I am wholly present at 
each and every time that I exist, it is not altogether clear why I may possess 
contradictory intrinsic properties at different times.  
 The problem of temporary intrinsics only takes hold when the temporal theory 
that you are presupposing understands each time as being ontologically respectable. 
This fact entails that if the B-series account of time holds at the fundamental level of 
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reality, then perdurantism must also be true. Thus, Brogaard and Gatzia (2014) 
concluded that, “if there are any enduring entities, then there are ontologically 
primitive or irreducible, A-theoretical properties”(Ibid, p. 9). That is, if our tensed 
perceptions are veridical and the B-theory is true, then tensed properties must be 
primitive and irreducible, strongly emergent, properties.  
 You can deny the existence of tensed properties and remain consistent with 
our best physics. However, this tense nihilism will cost you the ability to make sense 
of why some tensed perceptions and judgments are more accurate than others. You 
could posit tensed properties as features of the fundamental level of reality. But this 
comes at the cost of remaining consistent with our best physical theory of time. 
Finally, you can posit the existence of tensed properties as strongly emergent, 
fundamental, entities of our world. This solves the problem of tense while remaining 
consistent with the truth of the B-series and our best physics, but at the cost of 
positing entities into our ontology that are not, strictly speaking, physical. Is solving 
the problem of tense worth jettisoning property-physicalism?  
 I am inclined to think not. I am also inclined to believe that there is a fourth 
solution— a solution that not only solves the problem of tense but also remains 
consistent with the truth of the B-theory of time— thus physics— and property-
physicalism. But it’s not free. In the following section, I turn to the work of John Heil 
(2003) who offers a critique of the received view of how truth-makers operate within 
truthmaking. In the next section, I then turn to his positive account of what truth-
makers might amount to (Heil 2012) in order to provide a new outlook on what 
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truthmaking might actually require of an ontology— an outlook that I argue allows us 
to make this fourth solution a reality.  
 
SECTION II: THE PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
  Each theory presented above implicitly presupposes that the truth-makers for 
tensed judgments must be tensed properties. The tense nihilist denies the existence of 
tensed properties, thereby denying the veridicality of tensed perceptions and 
proposing the falsity of all tensed judgments. Presentists presuppose tensed properties 
to be real at the fundamental level of reality. Weak tense emergentists ran into a 
contradiction because they presupposed ontologically salient, if not reducible, tensed 
properties. Strong tense emergentists go so far as to presuppose the possibility of 
fundamental non-physical properties in order to posit tensed properties.  
I believe this implicit presupposition follows from what John Heil (2003) 
terms ‘the Picture Theory of language’ (PTL). The PTL is a conception of how truth-
makers operate that presumes true representations (linguistic or otherwise) ‘read off’ 
features of reality. That is, the PTL presupposes that truths dictate the architecture of 
our ontology. Heil’s contention is not that contemporary philosophers explicitly 
accept the PTL, but that they suppose it as an unproblematic norm pertaining to 
‘realism’.  
It is not strange at all for contemporary philosophers to conceptualize realism 
about a given domain in terms of commitment to the fact that true predicates in the 
domain ‘pick out’ distinct properties in the world. For instance, to say you’re a realist 
about value is to say that you suppose normative predicates designate true, or 
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authentic, properties possessed by subjects. In the same way, to say you’re a realist 
about mental states is to say that you believe true predicates concerning mental states 
to entail genuine properties held by a mind.  
This view of how truth-makers operate results from the blind acceptance of 
the PTL and a corollary correspondence principle: 
(Φ): When a predicate applies truly to an object, it does so in virtue of 
designating a property possessed by that object and by every object to which 
the predicate truly applies (or would apply).3 
This principle (Φ) conveys the thought that if a predicate ‘F’ is true, it is true in virtue 
of some object bearing the property, F, and any other object that might hold the 
property, F.  
The PTL and the corollary principle (Φ) set a rather high bar for what can 
actually count as a truth-maker. There seem to be very few properties that actually 
live up to principle (Φ). Take the predicate ‘is blue’. We might ask if the predicate ‘is 
blue’ truly picks out some one property. If we think so, then we might think that ‘is 
blue’ does truly apply to many objects, thus accepting (Φ). But can you really think of 
a single property that all blue things share and by which they all satisfy the predicate 
‘is blue’? In the same way, we might ask if ‘is in pain’ picks out some one property. 
Many different sorts of critters experience pain: dogs, lizards and maybe even aliens 
experience pain. None of these critters—dogs, lizards or aliens—share anything close 
to perfect physiological uniformity with the others. There is no single unified, or 
identical, physical property to which we could ascribe the function of outputting pain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3This formulation is taken from Heil (2003) and Heil (1999). 
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That is, there is not a single ‘type’ of physical property that is symmetrical with a 
‘type’ of pain property. 
To live up to this high bar, philosophers have had to turn to ‘multiple 
realizability’ in order to produce adequate properties. For every instance, or ‘token’, 
pain property there is a corresponding instance, or ‘token’, physical property that 
realizes the pain property. If this is correct, the realizing property token, i.e. the 
physical property token, could vary from life-form to life-form while the realized 
property, pain, remains a singular property throughout. On this account, if being in 
pain is a property, then it is a ‘higher-level’, realized, property. 
Multiple realizability maintains principle (Φ) quite neatly by creating a 
scaffolded conception of reality that incorporates irreducibly ‘downwardly’ 
dependent levels of being. Every level depends on the level below it while 
ontologically existing on its own. In this way, the levels of reality, are 
‘asymmetrically downward dependent’, i.e. dependent on what is below but not what 
is above. As useful as this appears, it has paved the way for a number of difficulties. 
One difficulty with this view is causal over-determination. That is, what 
distinctive causal contribution could higher-level properties provide to the picture that 
are not pre-empted by the lower-level ‘realizing’ properties? Take Jaegwon Kim’s 
formulation of the problem of causal relevance, as seen in figure 1 (Kim 1993): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  t1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  t2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  H1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  H2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
realize	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  realize	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  P1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  P2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  causes	  	  
Figure	  1:	  Higher-­‐level	  Causation	  
	   17	  
 
 
 
 
 
Here Kim presupposes that mental properties are higher-level properties (H1 and H2), 
realized by lower-level physical properties of the nervous system (P1 and P2). That is, 
the mental properties are realized by physical states, i.e. states of the nervous system. 
Now, suppose you are in possession of some mental property H1 (being in pain) and 
this property in some sense causes another mental property H2 (the desire to find 
some aspirin). H2, however, is also realized by a physical property, P2. Also, 
physically speaking, P1 is the physical cause of P2. So, the question stands: in what 
sense does H1 really cause H2? If the physical state realizing the appearance of pain 
causes the physical state realizing the appearance of desire, does the higher-level 
appearance possess any causal relevance whatsoever? 
A further difficulty stems from the ambiguous supervenience relations 
presupposed to hold between different ontological levels (Heil 2003). Higher-level 
items, e.g. objects and properties, are—on the leveled view—supposed to be distinct 
from but ‘realized by’, i.e. dependent on, some way lower-level items are. This 
relation is sometimes referred to in the literature as a ‘supervenience’ relation. That 
is: some item, A, supervenes on another item, B, just in case any change in B 
necessitates a change in A. Or, put another way, A ontologically depends on B. If 
there is a change in B, the base, it follows that there will also be a change in A, the 
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realized property. Heil provides us with a supervenience principle of the following 
form: 
(S) Necessarily, if anything, x, has α in A then there is a property, β, in B, and, 
necessarily, if any x has β, x has α4. 
Principle (S) captures the sort of idea we have been presupposing is true of higher-
level properties when we say they are realized by lower-level properties. Heil, 
however, is quick to notice that principle (S) is dead silent when it comes to giving an 
account of the nature of the dependence determination relation that such a notion 
requires. The difficulty presents itself clearly when we ask why (S) is true. Principle 
(S) could be made true by a variety of means: A could supervene on B because As 
just are Bs, or because As and Bs are both caused by a third variable, Cs. 
Furthermore, these are just the supervenience relations that could hold apart from 
what the level-theorist has in mind when they appeal to ‘realization’. For the levels to 
be ontologically distinct— ‘realized’ items— such items must not be identifiable or 
caused by lower-level items (Heil 2003). In this way, the worry is not principle (S)—
qua principle (S)— but the grounding for principle (S): the truth-maker for (S). What 
accounts for dependence across levels?5 
While these difficulties are not conclusively damning, Heil believes these 
discrepancies issue from a deeper difficulty within the PTL itself. The contention of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 Heil (2003): This formulation of (S) expresses ‘strong supervenience’. Nothing Heil has to 
say here, he argues, depends, in any way, on which formulation of supervenience is 
presupposed (Footnote 8, p. 37) 5 One defense (Chalmers 1996), is to regard higher-level properties as the result of a sui 
generis conception of dependence. This sui generis conception would have to take the form 
of law like relations that hold vertically between higher and lower-level properties. Regarding 
further explanation of this brand of the dependence the defenders remain silent.   
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the PTL is that when a representation—a sentence, predicate or thought— is true this 
is true due to some way the world actually is. If this idea is left to its own devices, 
principles of the form (Φ) emerge. Principle (Φ) issues claims of the following form: 
(T) ‘a is F’ is true if and only if a is F.6 
This claim might, for some, be regarded as a harmless truism. Heil, following C.B. 
Martin (2000), disagrees. If we read the biconditional right-to-left, it appears to imply 
that for every way the world is, there corresponds a representational truth-bearer—a 
sentence, a thought, etc. That is, that for every way the world is, there must exist a 
representation that such a state of affairs necessarily entails. This point, for Heil and 
Martin, seems rather unlikely (Heil 2003). There would be many states of affairs in 
the world that did not have a truth-bearing representation. Furthermore, there is the 
more problematic notion that the identity of truth-makers can be hashed out in terms 
of some kind of entailment relation, i.e. that truth-makers are entailed by truths, to 
begin with. At the least, this form of entailment should be accounted for in some 
way— not implicitly presupposed in every instance of truthmaking! 
Heil argues that the idea that truths entail states of affairs in the world is 
inherently problematic due to the nature of how entailment itself is conventionally 
understood. Suppose we take certain ways the world is as the truth-makers for certain 
other empirical assertions. For instance, my shirt being wet under the armpits might 
be a truth-maker for the assertion that ‘Elliott’s shirt is wet under the armpits’. 
However, it is hard to see how the assertion ‘Elliott’s shirt is wet under the pits’, even 
if true, could be understood actually to entail anything beyond other linguistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 Taken from Heil 2003, p. 55. 
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assertions. Some state of affairs in the world—my shirt being wet under the pits—
doesn’t belong to a category that has historically been a candidate for being entailed. 
Entailment, Heil claims, is a relation of the sort that is normally thought to hold 
between representations or statements of a particular sort, e.g. logical statements. If 
there is entailment of any sort going on here, it is probably between the representative 
assertion ‘Elliott’s shirt is wet under the pits’ and another artifact of language, logic, 
or itself— which it obviously entails. But if we reject that identifying truth-makers 
necessarily involves an entailment relation to hold between parts of speech and state 
of affairs in the world, what accounts for identifying truth-makers? 
 
SECTION III: A NEW ESTIMATION OF TRUTH-MAKERS 
In rejecting the Picture Theory of Language, John Heil (2012) does more than 
refuse to accept that entailment can, or does, hold between articles of representation 
and the world. More importantly, he rejects the notion that language has anything to 
teach us about the architecture of ontology at all when he says, “…it is a mistake to 
imagine that we are in a position to extract ontological lessons from ways we talk 
about the universe” (ibid. p.152). In its place, he recommends that we look to the 
world itself to teach us about ontology. This is the crux of what Heil himself has 
termed “the ontological turn” in metaphysics.  
Adopting an “ontological” estimation of truth-makers is more than adopting a 
new set of entities (or substances) to use as truth-makers for our factual claims. The 
ontological enterprise for truthmaking is an overhaul of the apparatus for identifying 
truth-makers themselves. Where in the past we have posited a predicate or subject to 
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designate some appearance and then sought to find such an item in the world, Heil 
suggests we pay closer attention to the underlying “bringings about” of the 
appearances that we are quantifying over in order to discover their true nature. In this 
discovery, we find the ontologically deep story behind the appearance while at the 
same time setting the bar for what sort of stories might make it true that some 
“future” appearance is of the same, or a similar, ilk. On this account, the deep story, 
i.e. the actual state of affairs in the world, serves as the truth-maker for the linguistic 
term, not some theoretical entity the question of whose existence we set out to find in 
the first place. 
Ontology, Heil posits, builds from the bottom up. This requires that he follow 
the empirical work being done concerning the most basic “level” of reality. 
Fundamental physics has the final word concerning what we consider the “deep 
story” regarding a term. But this does not mean that all truths in the world reside at 
the subatomic level. Physics is itself a work in progress. However, whether the basic 
constitutive pieces of the world are corpuscular subatomic particles, quantum waves, 
or even just a monistic space-time whole, each posits the existence of a substratum— 
a simple substance. This is all Heil believes he needs to jumpstart a new account 
regarding truth-makers. 
Substance plays a major role in Heil’s account of truth-makers. Substances 
ultimately answer for all true designations in language. But as I said, Heil does not 
believe physics to possess a monopoly on truths. Nevertheless, a deeper 
understanding of substance is required for a full picture of a non-PTL account of 
truth-makers. 
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To be is to be some way or other. While this slogan might very well paint the 
banners of future proponents of the ontological turn, it is also a truism about 
substance. Substances must be some way or other. Or, in another way, substances 
must exist in some mode. We will adopt talk of properties here, but be clear these 
properties bear more resemblance to the ‘tropes’ of trope theory than to the robust 
universals of Armstrong.  
Heil’s properties have a barrage of idiosyncrasies that have been adopted from 
established theories and synthesized together. To begin with, properties are not 
separable from substance. Substance and property exist as correlative categories— 
virtually inseparable in all but thought. Substances must be some way; properties are 
just particular ways that substances are. In addition, properties, i.e. particular ways 
substances are, have two features. First, properties are qualitative. That is, there is 
something that it is like to possess or perceive a property. Properties are also 
powerful. That is, properties may act with other properties to manifest differential 
outcomes. Finally, only substances have properties. Substances are the way they are; 
these ways— modes or tropes— are properties. Properties do not belong to things that 
are not rightfully substances; things that are not rightfully substances do not possess 
properties. The picture of properties that emerges is one where substances are 
particular ways that are not only qualitatively rich, but also full of power. This 
characterization allows for quite a breadth of explanatory power. But, for the whole 
story, we must turn our attention back to truthmaking. 
An example might be helpful to bridge the gap between what I have already 
said regarding substance and what I intend to say about truth-makers. Truthmaking 
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after the ontological turn behaves a lot like how we act when stargazing. We look up 
at the brilliant night sky and notice certain patterns. We see lions, men, women and 
scales. We call them out by names— ‘Leo’, ‘Orion’, ‘Andromeda’ and ‘Libra’. Our 
reference, it would seem, is not a single star, but a star collection— a small set of 
stars that are most vivid to us. We might say things like, “Andromeda appeared 
earlier this year” or “Libra seldom makes an appearance in the southern hemisphere 
during summer.” What makes this the case? Is a constellation a singular entity, or is it 
a collection of stars? In our language, we often make true statements about the 
astrological tendencies of constellations, but to what do we refer; what makes the 
reference true? There are near infinitely many ways to cut up the sky. Which ones are 
the true divisions; which the false?  
While the PTL might have us looking for people and objects in the sky, we 
should be able to see the forest for the trees. The reference is a collection of stars, 
duly positioned and organized. The collection is no more or less real than a single 
star. The collection is no more or less a functional entity than the star. We often use 
constellations for entertainment and navigation, which might be impossible if we 
were only aware of single (non-brilliant) stars. What I want you to do is imagine for a 
moment that a collection of stars could be quantified over truthfully under a single 
true nominal designation. If you can grant me this, I think I can get you the rest of the 
way. 
We live in a world of substances, not stars. Each substance is a particular way. 
Much like stars, collections of substances might have a different importance to us 
depending on how we perceive it and at what level of scrutiny. Which levels count? 
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Which produce true perceptions? The answer could be all of them. The answer could 
be none of them. Or the answer could be that we need to call into question the need 
for extra reality at any level whatsoever.  
We commonly note, and then seek to communicate, important patterns by way 
of an internal or external sign, a thought or an utterance with certain conditions for 
application. This is the role of language. The application conditions of language 
dictate what appearances fall under what utterances. But this does no more than mark 
similarities in the manifold of appearances. The complex interaction of substances, or 
the modes of substances, answers for whether the appearance in question should truly 
fall under this or that linguistic utterance. These are the reasons for the sign’s 
placement. These are the building blocks of a deep ontological story for the 
perceptual appearance in question. Why can’t the truth-maker for a named appearance 
just be the propertied substances that actually bring the named appearance about?  An 
account of this process is what has been called up to this point the ontologically “deep 
story” concerning truth-makers. 
Truths follow from the manifestation conditions of an appearance. The 
utterance ‘Tomato’, for instance, could stand for a general sort of appearance. 
‘Tomato’ is an article of language that picks out a certain sort of appearance. We are 
not left in confusion when someone talks about a tomato. We seem to have a pretty 
good idea as to what such an utterance refers. What makes it true that it is a ‘tomato’ 
is a certain story regarding the similarities of its manifestation with other such 
manifestations. If we were to index the subject to ‘this tomato’, this utterance, too, 
has a certain extension to a certain set of substances and their mutual manifestation.  
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This process extends to what might be considered “normal” properties, as 
well. Utterances like ‘red’, ‘round’ and ‘firm’ all pick out manifestations of 
substances, or the properties of substances, engaging in formulations of reciprocal 
action. In this way, complex “properties”, like red, round and firm, differ very little 
from complex “subjects”, like tomatoes, bicycles and dandelions. Neither modes of 
utterance need pick out ontologically distinct wholes, i.e. they need not pick out 
substances. Instead, these utterances pick out mutual manifestations of substances— 
or many ways the substance is, or substances are. The truth-makers for all non-
substance terms rely on the mutual manifestation of powerful ways the substances 
are— or the substance is. All assertions implementing such utterances are, or can be, 
literally true.  
From this account, it would seem that we need two things in our ontology— 
propertied substances and relations. I have already given an account of what the 
ontological status of substances amount to. But what is the ontological status of a 
relation? 
Assertions regarding relations, much like assertions regarding ordinary objects 
in the special sciences, are made true by certain dynamic arrangements of the 
fundamental substance, or substances. That is, relational predications like, 
‘Copenhagen is north of Florida’, ‘Simias is taller than Socrates’ and ‘Dianna is the 
mother of William’ are made true by non-relational facts about the world. That is, 
relational truths have non-relational truth-makers. If, as Heil has posited, true 
predicates need not entail the existence of certain properties, then we are left in a 
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position to provide our own account of truth-makers for certain predicates— 
including relational predicates. 
The difficulty with relations results from relations being dependent on their 
relata. That makes them look like modes (properties). On the other hand, they don’t 
seem to belong to any of the related members, individually. If we ask, “who bears the 
relation?”, it seems to belong to the area between the relata, a separate thing. If the 
area between the relata can bear properties—if there is something that it is like— it 
starts to look like a substance. So relations seem to operate as both substance and 
property.  
We have a choice of whether we want to invite relations in as a fundamental 
part of our ontology— joining propertied substances— or whether we want to 
accommodate them some other way. As I mentioned before, Heil is committed to a 
very basic account of ontology that only includes propertied substances. Thus, he 
chooses to accommodate judgments concerning relations by asserting that such 
judgments are made true by virtue of non-relational features of the universe—namely, 
propertied substances.  
Heil’s dialectic goes as follows (Heil 2012): if we choose not to eliminate 
relational predicates, our first thought is that the truth-makers for these relational 
truths must be relations themselves—thus adding a new fundamental category to our 
ontology. If we find this picture unappealing, the weight falls on us to explain how 
non-relational features of the universe could provide truth-makers for every single 
relational truth. Heil suggests we focus on ‘internal relations’ and build out from 
there. We can consider six’s being greater than five as an internal relation, i.e. a 
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relation that seems to stem from the very essence of these numbers themselves. 
Relations, if understood this way, necessitate that you could not have five and six 
without having six’s being greater than five. If you have the relata, A and B, you 
could not help but have relation, R. If you could, then the relation is not internal. To 
put this thought in another way, “non-relational features of relata are truth-makers for 
truths concerning internal relations”(ibid. p. 145). By virtue of all the objects existing, 
all the internal relations exist, with no addition of being required. 
Returning to our Simias and Socrates example: Simias being taller than 
Socrates is merely a matter of understanding Simias to be a certain height and 
Socrates to be a certain height. Let’s say Simias is six feet tall and Socrates is five 
feet tall. By Simias being six feet tall, he is taller than five foot tall Socrates. If you 
have the intrinsic features of the relata, you have the relation. Internal relations are 
founded on non-relational, intrinsic, features of the relata. It now seems that we could 
plausibly have relational truths in an ontology that fails to include relations as 
independently existing entities. But to succeed in accounting for all relational truths 
we must turn our attention to external relations.  
Paradigm cases for irreducible external relations include spatial, temporal and 
causal relations. As far as spatial relations are concerned, let’s take our favored 
example, ‘Copenhagen is north of Florida’, and consider the account of propertied 
substances already given. In having substances, you have the substances inhabiting a 
certain location in space-time— regardless of whether the substance is corpuscular or 
the pervasive whole.  By having the substance, you have its location. Florida, if 
treated like a substance, inhabits a definite position in space. Likewise, Copenhagen, 
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if treated like a substance, also inhabits a definite position in space. By having both 
Florida and Copenhagen, we have two substances located in different regions of 
space. Within the application conditions for ‘north’ we have in mind a certain 
directional orientation. It just so happens that according to our directional orientation, 
Copenhagen ends up fulfilling the conditions of being north of Florida.  
Nothing was added except the application conditions for ‘North’, i.e. what it 
would take to be north, which is a mere matter of linguistic convention. What remains 
salient are the positions of both Copenhagen and Florida, which are, on this view, 
intrinsic features of Copenhagen and Florida themselves. If you have Copenhagen at 
a determinate location in space and you have Florida at a determinate location in 
space, you have the spatial relation between them—which by our convention is one of 
north and south. The truth-maker for ‘Copenhagen is north of Florida’ is the position 
of Copenhagen and the position of Florida; our conventional application condition 
adds no additional being.  
If the dimension of time is understood to be akin to a spatial dimension, then 
this account should unproblematicly extend to temporal relations as well. Let us use 
the relation ‘Abraham Lincoln’s death is earlier than John F. Kennedy’s death.’ 
Again, in having substances, you have the substances inhabiting a certain location in 
space-time— regardless of whether the substance is corpuscular or the pervasive 
whole. That is, by having the substance you have its location in the temporal 
dimension. If treated like a substance, Abraham Lincoln inhabits some definite 
extension in space-time. If we restrict our example even more and only appraise a 
single temporal part associated with the death of Lincoln, e.g. Lincoln on April 15 
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1865 at 7:22a.m., then we have a definite location on the space-time continuum 
inhabited by Lincoln. In the same way, if we appraise the temporal part of Kennedy 
that was concurrent with his death, e.g. Kennedy on November 22 1963 at 1:00pm, 
then we have another definite location on the space-time continuum, this time 
inhabited by Kennedy. By having both Lincoln and Kennedy, we have two substances 
located in different regions of space and time. Within the application conditions for 
‘before’ we have in mind a certain directional orientation in time. It just so happens 
that according to our directional orientation, Lincoln’s death ends up fulfilling the 
conditions of being earlier than Kennedy’s death.  
As was the case with spatial relations, nothing was added to the intrinsic 
locations of the substances appraised; besides the application conditions for ‘earlier 
than’, i.e. what it would take to be earlier than, which is a matter of linguistic 
convention brought about by the appearance of such A-series properties as an event’s 
being past or future relative to the present.7 What remains salient are the positions of 
both Lincoln and Kennedy, which are intrinsic features of Lincoln and Kennedy 
themselves. If you have Lincoln at a determinate location in time and you have 
Kennedy at a determinate location in time, you have the temporal relation between 
them—which by our convention is one of earlier than and later than. The truth-maker 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This harkens back, in some ways, to an argument given by McTaggart (1908), in which he 
argues that the truth of the A-series of time is essential to grant true directional relations in 
the B-series, i.e. those of ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than.’ However, instead of using this 
revelation to argue that an A-series is necessary for B-series relations, I only posit that the 
appearance of the A-series, i.e. of time flowing from future to present to past, is necessary to 
set in place the common practice of regarding time as having a direction. This I contend adds 
no additional being, thus no additional truth-maker to the relation. In the end, we have two 
definite portions of substance at two definite positions in time. To say one is earlier than 
another is just to grant additional conventional information without additional being. Just as if 
I were to give both positions a numerical designation and set the convention that numbers 
closer to ‘1’ were in a ‘prior to’ relation to those further from ‘1.’  
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for ‘Abraham Lincoln’s death is earlier than John F. Kennedy’s death’ is a 
determinate position of Lincoln and a determinate position of Kennedy; our 
conventional application condition adds no additional being, only conventional 
directional orientations.  
The role events play in this account has yet to be mentioned. It stands to 
reason that using the deaths of Lincoln and Kennedy for my example above seems to 
beg the question concerning the existence of events. Following Heil (2012), events, 
rightly regarded, are a substance’s possession of a property at a certain time. He 
eschews the idea that an event could possess a property itself. This is due to the fact 
that properties, on Heil’s account, are ways that substances are and events are not 
themselves substances.  
Events, like the directional flow of time, are conventional tools through which 
we individuate, measure and talk about propertied substances. It seems like when we 
talk about an event we are taking two things into account: how the substances is and 
where in the temporal dimension that substance is. I believe this is to talk about one 
too many things. As I have just argued, I believe a substance’s location in the 
temporal dimension is an intrinsic feature of that substance. In this way, where the 
substance is in time is a property of that substance. Thus, an event is just the appraisal 
of how a substance is with an eye toward the temporal dimension. In this way, the 
truth-maker for a true linguistic (or representational) judgment about an event would 
be some substance located in some way at some position in time, not an ‘event entity’ 
out in the world.      
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If we turn to causal relations, the “received view” of causation dictates that for 
causation to occur one event (a cause) brings about another distinct event (an effect). 
The relations between these events are: asymmetrical (linear, from cause to effect), 
nonreflexive (all effects have distinct causes), and transitive (if X causes Y and Y 
causes Z, then X causes Z). There is a plurality of ways that this appearance is 
conceived, but Heil believes all conceptions fall victim to the same sin of ignoring the 
meat of the issue, what he calls ‘causings’, for the sake of some form of 
universalization. That is, they miss the trees (the “deep story”) for the forest (a 
generalization concerning certain causal interactions). If Heil is right, the trees 
provide the all the truth-makers we need for the forest. 
Examples for what Heil refers to as ‘causings’ focus on complex and 
continuous interactions between elements as partners in the bringing about of a 
certain situation instead of as actor and receiver. A favored example involves stirring 
salt into water, “(t)he received view might lead you to think that the water and the salt 
are related as agent and patient…perhaps the water possesses an ‘active’ power to 
dissolve salt, and salt, a complementary ‘passive’ power to be dissolved in water” 
(ibid. p. 118). But if we attend to what happens with an eye toward Heil’s account of 
properties as powerful qualities, it seems that certain powerful qualities of the salt are 
interacting with certain powerful qualities of the water. What is produced is a 
continuous, symmetrical relation between elements, not a sequential series of 
events— “(b)oth the salt and the water work in concert to yield a certain 
result…”(ibid). This interaction is referred to as a causing.  
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 At one stage, the salt is crystalline; at another, it is saline. This sequence is far 
from being the true causal nexus— or the deep story of causation. Rather, the process 
is a continuous interaction between elements that produces the result. But what the 
salt and the water amount to, in this example, are what Heil refers to as ‘reciprocal 
partners’, each of which possesses ‘reciprocal powers’. The result of the interaction is 
referred to as a ‘mutual manifestation’, which possesses new dispositional powers 
that are capable of pairing with further reciprocal partners to produce further 
manifestations.  
If we want to reconcile what has come before, with the “received” language, 
we can think of causation as having two elements: ‘causings’ (cause) and ‘outcomes’ 
(effects). Causings are the processes that bring about mutual manifestations through 
the reciprocal powers of reciprocal partners. Outcomes are the manifestations 
themselves. What Heil attempts to display in this recapitulation of causation is that, 
ontologically understood, causes and effects are not where the “action is”. The action 
belongs to the causings.  
Several elements of ‘causings’ should be made clear. First, true causings are 
usually the interaction of many reciprocal powers. We often see an effect and look for 
the cause, as if causation is shaped like a train. Instead we should view causings as a 
web of interrelated reciprocal partners. On a related note—secondly— the so-called 
“status quo” is not a matter of reciprocal partners waiting to enter into a powerful 
relationship. Causation is a continuous endeavor, even in the absence of “action” the 
status quo itself is being sustained by the interrelation of reciprocal partners— a 
powerful, if not interesting, manifestation. Third, and finally, reciprocal powers 
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possess the ability to differentially manifest depending on the powers of their 
reciprocal partner. For instance, if I drop my salt into sand, the manifestation resulting 
would be different then that of dropping salt into water. All this to say, the same 
reciprocal power may produce different mutual manifestations.8  
 
SECTION IV: TOWARDS A NEW SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF 
TENSE 
Tensed judgments are made true by tenseless features of reality. Qualitatively 
rich and powerful ways that substances are interact in qualitative and powerful ways 
to produce manifestations of the sort that we linguistically demark with tensed 
language. If we adopt Heil’s ontological account of what truth-truth-makers might 
actually amount to, tensed judgments are made true by the very process that leads to 
their manifestation in the first place. 
For an account of how Heil’s propertied substances could reciprocally 
manifest in such a way as to produce the outcome of the appearance that we have, 
until this point, labeled ‘tense,’ we need not look any further than the SET mechanism 
proposed by Brogaard and Gatzia (2014) in Section I. This mechanism was composed 
of several modules: a pacemaker, a switch, and an accumulator, as well as working 
and reference memory banks with a comparator. The linear perception of time was 
accounted for by a pacemaker, which produced consistent pulses and an accumulator 
that stored these pulses in the working and reference memory. When an event was 
being timed, the switch allowed the accumulator to collect the pulses that were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 For more on ‘causings’ and Heil’s argument against the “received view” see The Universe 
As We Find It (2012), Chapter 6 (pp. 117-134). 
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emitted by the pacemaker. At the end of the timed event, the resulting number of 
pulses was compared with another reference time. This process produced perceptions 
of different time intervals in the working memory. These perceptions were important 
in many temporal tasks, such as comparing differential intervals for similarity. These 
comparative readings were then stored in the reference memory.  
The SET account of tensed judgments functioned very efficiently in the role it 
was created to serve, but had one serious flaw. Those implementing the mechanism 
believed the mechanism in question to be doing something that it could not. Namely, 
converting tenseless B-theoretical properties into dynamically tensed A-theoretical 
properties. This outcome could not be achieved because the existence of B-theoretical 
properties at the fundamental level of reality precluded the availability of tensed A-
theoretical properties in the ontology. If, however, you are not wishing to posit A-
theoretical properties, the SET mechanism provides a very helpful way to account for 
the appearance of tense and motion.  
I am not in the business of looking for tensed A-theoretical properties to 
anchor true judgments concerning tense. The account that I presuppose, of what 
counts as a truth-maker, rests the condition for identifying the truth-maker upon the 
actual process that brings about the appearance that my linguistic utterance set out to 
demarcate— not an ontologically robust higher-level property. This being the case, 
the SET account provides me with a useful tool for explaining certain appearances by 
providing a portion of the deep story of tense. However, it is important to note that 
my account of tense does not rise and fall with the SET account. Such an account 
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could be supplanted in the wake of better science, which would in turn provide a new 
story regarding the appearance of tense.  
If we do work under the assumption that the SET account captures the process 
of producing tensed appearance, the remainder of the story will be accounted for by 
explaining the manifestation of the modules we have presupposed in terms of the 
mutual manifestations of propertied substances. This process would be aided by 
identifying the physical realizers of the presumed modules in neuroscience.  
Barring further neurological evidence, the best I can do is plot the deep story 
out theoretically. Qualitatively rich and independently powerful ways that substances 
are—or the substance is— mutually manifest in certain patterns as to produce a 
pacemaker, a switch, an accumulator, working and reference memory bank modules 
and a comparator. The abilities of these modules to work in concert are accounted for 
by the underlying way the interacting substances that compose them are. The 
mechanism reads off the positions of certain other complex manifestations in its 
readings. These are not the independently existent B-properties that we had assumed, 
but instead the manifestation partners that allow for B-properties to manifest. That is, 
the B-theoretical properties, which are relations, e.g. ‘x is earlier than y’, are the 
result of a manifestational pair of positions in space-time, which are the truth-makers 
for the relation. In this way, they are not all that different from what I argue A-
theoretical properties amount to.   
 When taken as a whole, positions of the substances in the dimension of time, 
the working memory, the reference memory and the comparator produce a 
manifestation of the perception of motion over time. This manifestation interacts with 
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the remainder of the brain to render judgments of where the object is, where it was 
and where the object will be. These manifestations are the deep story regarding the 
bringing about of tensed perceptions. Judgments based on these perceptions are what 
we have, up until this point, labeled tensed judgments. 
The SET mechanism produces both the means for the deep story regarding 
true judgments of tense as well as false judgments of tense. The malfunctioning of the 
mechanism, or the addition of extra manifestational partners, result in different 
manifestations than what would be expected otherwise. The application conditions for 
the appearance of motion over time are accounted for by the function of the SET 
mechanism, a complex manifestation of propertied substances. This process is the 
truth-maker for the characteristics normally ascribed to objects in motion through 
time, i.e. tensed perceptions. When we make a judgment based upon the continued 
outcome of this process in the presence of an additional manifestation partner, our 
judgments are false.  
This account of tensed judgments comes at the cost of the received view 
concerning what truth-makers actually amount to and the assumption of a certain 
understanding of substances—as being the bearers of certain modes of being that are 
both qualitative and powerful. The benefits of the ontological account of tense may be 
understood by comparison to the accounts given above. As opposed to the tense 
nihilist account, the ontological account just given remains consistent with our best 
physics while also giving an account of the differential accuracy of some tensed 
perceptions as opposed to others. This benefit was achieved by abandoning the 
position that truths regarding tense necessitated tensed properties. The rejection of the 
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PTL allowed for this maneuver. The adoption of qualitatively powerful ways that 
substances are allowed for the ability to differentiate between falsidical and veridical 
perceptions of tense, which allowed for true and false judgments concerning tense. 
As opposed to the presentist account of tense, the ontological account remains 
consistent with our best physics while allowing for a deep story concerning the 
distinction between veridical and falsidical tensed perceptions. This was also 
achieved by replacing the PTL with an account of truth-makers that relied on 
qualitatively powerful ways that substances are to account for the appearance of 
tense. 
My account adopts key features of the weak tense emergentist account while 
sidestepping the contradiction that rendered the account untenable. Because the weak 
tense emergentist account relied on the SET mechanism to produce tensed properties 
on the basis of the tenseless underlying level of reality, the weak emergentist account 
fell prey to the problem of temporary intrinsics. This weakness resulted from the need 
of this account to produce real tensed properties to make tensed perceptions veridical 
and tensed judgments true. I argue that this need results from an implicit assumption 
of the PTL, and the sort of truth-makers that it necessitates. By rejecting the PTL, I 
have borrowed the weak tense emergentist’s SET mechanism to give the deep story 
regarding the appearance of tense. 
A strong tense emergentist account never has time to get off the ground. This 
mode of accounting for tense relies, as with all the received views, on the implicit 
acceptance of the PTL, as well as the absolute necessity for favoring the B-theory of 
time and the importance of addressing the problem of tense. Unfortunately, this 
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account relied upon the addition of a new means for the arrival of properties that 
departed from a completely physicalist picture of the world. My account, if adopted, 
remains consistent with the truth of the B-theory of time, addresses the problem of 
tense and remains consistent with property-physicalism. This achievement rests solely 
upon the recapitulation of what counts as a truth-maker and the acceptance of 
qualitatively powerful ways that substances are. If these assumptions are adopted then 
I have successfully navigated a new solution to the problem of tense. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Judgments concerning tensed perceptions are made true by the arrangement of 
qualitative and powerful ways that substances are. This position remains consistent 
with our fundamental physics and the truth of the B-theory of time. It provides an 
explanation for a distinction between veridical and falsidical perceptions of time, 
which allows for an account of true and false judgments of tense. This outcome is 
achieved by replacing a certain estimation of what truth-makers amount to that 
requires ontologically robust properties to account for true predications. In its place, 
my account follows John Heil (2003) in positing that the truth-makers for a given 
appearance should be considered those elements of our world that actually bring that 
appearance about. These elements need not be ontologically rich isomorphic 
properties corresponding to portions of our language, but the interaction of 
qualitatively powerful simple substances at a certain level of physical complexity 
(Heil 2012).  
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I began by presenting and reviewing received solutions to the problem of 
tense (Section I). These solutions included: tense nihilism, presentism, weak tense 
emergence and strong tense emergence. Tense nihilism failed to account for the 
problem of tense but seemed to remain consistent with the truth of the B-series of 
time and our best physical account of the world. Presentism accounted for the 
problem of tense but rejected the truth of the B-series of time supported by our best 
physics. Weak tense emergence seemed to solve the problem of tense, but ran afoul of 
the problem of temporary intrinsics. Strong tense emergence solves the problem of 
tense while presupposing the truth of the B-theory of time while rejecting that all 
properties result from solely physical processes. This outcome rejects property-
physicalism. 
I argued that each of these accounts relied upon a certain account of truth-
makers that requires each true predicate to entail some ontologically robust property 
out in the world (Section II). I further argued that this account led by necessity to the 
scaffolding of one’s ontology into downwardly dependent levels of being. This 
maneuver once posited leads to questions concerning over-determination and what 
downwardly dependent supervenience relations actually amount to. Following Heil 
(2003), I advanced the position that this whole enterprise of identifying truth-makers 
depended upon an unexplained relation of entailment between articles of 
representation and states of affairs in the world. 
I followed Heil (2012) in rejecting this estimation of what it takes to be a 
truth-maker by turning to the actual process that brings the appearance— denoted by 
language— about (Section III). This account of truth-makers amounted to allowed for 
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a simplified account of ontology, only positing qualitatively powerful modes of 
substances. I went on to explain how, on the basis of propertied substances alone, I 
could account for complex objects and relations, both spatial and causal.  
This new outlook on truth-makers allowed for the reevaluation of what makes 
tensed judgments true (Section IV). I argued that tensed judgments were made true by 
tenseless feature of our world. To accomplish this, I employed the SET mechanism 
that was previously implemented by the weak tense emergentist to give a possible 
story for how propertied substances could mutually manifest in such a way as to bring 
about the appearances that we denote using tensed language. I then undertook the 
explanation of how this mechanism could be the outcome of the mutual manifestation 
of propertied substance. I concluded by explaining the theoretical costs and 
advantages of my account in comparison to tense nihilism, presentism, weak tense 
emergence and strong tense emergence. 
  I advocate a new account of tensed perceptions and tensed judgments based 
upon a divergent estimation of what counts as a truth-maker for a given truth. My 
account involves the powerful arrangement of interacting propertied substances. 
When you say true things about the appearance of tense, the truth-makers for your 
judgments are these powerful arrangements. To accept this picture is to discover a 
new criterion for truth-makers and what tensed perceptions might amount to after the 
ontological turn.  
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